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CONSIDERING CLAUSEWITZ ACROSS CONTEXTS 
By Laura Salter 
One of the greatest phenomena of human history is man’s penchant for 
destruction: namely, by waging war. Mankind’s ability to organize and execute 
combat has developed drastically over the centuries, with philosophies of its 
purpose, justice, and motivations flourishing alongside. Few military theories 
have achieved the longevity and diverse applicability of that of Prussian General 
Carl von Clausewitz (see Figure 2). His magnum opus On War (originally Vom 
Kriege) was published posthumously in 1832. Since then, it has been studied 
and re-studied, analyzed and reviewed, praised and criticized, and used as a key 
text by scholars and soldiers alike. What explains the continuous relevance of 
Clausewitz’s theory, despite changing contexts and technology? Clausewitz’s 
addition to the philosophical discussion was uniquely suited to apply to a host of 
cases, across diverse cultures and vastly different streams of political thought. 
His intention and his methods aimed for accuracy and applicability. First, he 
achieved this by defining war as a tool of politics fundamentally composed of 
political reason, the hatred or will of the people, and chance. These ideas in 
addition to his methodology and approach to the subject, and his description of 
the nature of war and of man’s reactions therein, has allowed Clausewitz’s 
theory to influence a tremendously diverse spectrum of readers and remain a 
uniquely flexible and applicable treatise on war. 
Writing in the shadow of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz brought to 
his treatise the expertise of having been a soldier, and the worldview of having 
seen a massive war restructure the political landscape of Europe. He built his 
theories largely on his observations of the years in and around Napoleon’s reign. 
The French Revolution of 1789 was the beginning of the end of the monarchy, 
preceding decades of violence in the continent. In the 1790s, a young Napoleon 
Bonaparte witnessed his country descend from revolution into anarchy and 
terror.1 Struggling to self- identify either as a republic or a monarchy, France’s 
tumult bred factions and resulted in a vacuum of structure in politics and the 
military. In 1799, Napoleon became First Consul.  
By 1804, he had declared himself emperor, and was ready to wage a 
ferocious war to expand his empire over the continent. He reorganized the 
French army and pioneered the permanent corps structure—already altering the 
1 Robert Asprey, The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: Basic Books, 
2008), 45. 
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way modern war would be conducted and demonstrating his strategic brilliance.2 
Napoleon’s triumphs during the years that followed were unprecedented, until 
the scope of his armies and his battles grew so large that strategic errors became 
inevitable.3Finally, his downfall began with the Peninsular War of 1808-1813, 
when Spanish nationalistic sentiment, with British support, fueled a fight against 
Napoleon’s appointment of his brother as king of Spain.4In 1812, Napoleon 
faced a war on another front with his infamous invasion and disastrous retreat 
from Russia. 1814 brought the end of French gloire as Russian and British 
troops invaded France with the help of a renewed ally: Prussia, home of Carl 
von Clausewitz. 
Clausewitz bore witness to the political and militaristic events 
occurring across the continent, a context whose role was paramount as it 
provided allusions and references found in his theory. King Frederick’s Prussia 
joined the war against France in 1806, but suffered significant defeats in the 
Battles of Jena and Auerstadt on October 14. A passionately distraught article 
published in 1813 described the shocking wreckage and torrential bloodshed that 
ensued when the formidable Prussian forces met the “modern tactics of 
France.”5 The loss shattered Prussian spirits. What followed was a period of 
demoralization and subordination that bolstered a new trend of nationalist 
sentiment.6 
Young Prussians, like Clausewitz, were driven by patriotism and 
resentment to pursue military reform and eventually repel the French invaders. 
Clausewitz was born in 1780 and had entered the Prussian Army a mere 12 
years later, in 1792. From 1801-1803, he studied at the Military School at 
Berlin, where he became acquainted with men who greatly influenced the 
Prussian military, as well as Clausewitz’s own life and works, like General 
Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who became one of Clausewitz’s major mentors.7 
Over the course of his life, Clausewitz experienced the breadth of military 
service. He served as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia; was 
wounded, taken prisoner, and kept in France; and he assisted with the 
reformation of the Prussian Army in the period following its defeat. The 
2 Gregory Fremont-Barnes and Todd Fisher, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise 
and Fall of an Empire (Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2004), 10. 
3 Ibid., 14. 
4 Funk & Wagnalls New World Encyclopedia (2016): s.v. “Napoleonic Wars.” 
5 Destructive Effects of the War,” Jamaica Magazine 3, no. 2 (February 1813): 
95. 
6 Fremont-Barnes and Fisher, 253-256. 
7 Dictionary of World Biography, Vol. 5, s.v. “Carl von Clausewitz.” 
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modernization of the army imitated the effective methodology of the French 
Grande Armée—it was reorganized, no longer based on nobility or seniority, and 
featured modernized tactics for warfare.8 Later, Clausewitz became the military 
instructor to Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, which gave him the 
opportunity to pen his emergent military theories in his essay Principles of 
War.9  In 1812, Clausewitz left to fight alongside the Russians. At this point, 
Prussia had been under French occupation for five long years. It was under these 
circumstances that Clausewitz assisted in the negotiations of the pivotal 
convention of Tauroggen in 1812, wherein General Ludwig York set the stage 
for an alliance with Russia and other nations that opposed Napoleon, 
abandoning Prussia’s French alliance.10 Clausewitz remained in the Russian 
service until 1814. The following year, the fateful Battle of Waterloo brought the 
Napoleonic Wars to a close. Napoleon abdicated his throne and was exiled. The 
wars were over, but their impact resounded. 
Clearly, the time period was critical to the development of Clausewitz’s 
thought. Most of his life was devoted to and surrounded by warfare. A military 
man since the age of 12, his brilliant and studious mind was saturated with 
strategy. Clausewitz began to climb in the ranks to become Chief of Staff of 
several corps over the years, and was named Director of the Military School at 
Berlin in 1818.11 His experience in the field provided practical examples of how 
states behave and pursue power, giving his studies a historical foundation rooted 
in practical experience. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were 
so pivotal to military development and European political society that emerging 
theories of war had to compete with one another while keeping up with the 
changing nature of politics and warfare.12 Clausewitz began writing his 
observations and ideas into eight books to address this lack of a consistent 
understanding. 
Crucial to a discussion of the historical and personal influences on 
Clausewitz’s work is mention of his most significant relationship, his 
intellectual stimulant: his wife, Marie von Clausewitz. A well-educated woman 
for her time, Marie was a close observer of the Napoleonic Wars and 
                                                 
8 Fremont-Barnes and Fisher, 263. 
9 Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans./ed. by Hans Wilhelm Gatzke, 
Vol. 82 (Harrisburg: PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1942), accessed October 
9, 2016. 
10 Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, trans. by Francis 
Egerton (London: John Murray, 1843), accessed 06 November 2016. 
11 Clausewitz, On War, translator’s note, 12-13. 
12 “Destructive Effects of the War,” 97. 
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outspokenly political.13 Through years of correspondence followed by a loving 
marriage, Marie was privy to the formation of her husband’s celebrated theory 
of war. In her preface to On War, she wrote that 
as they shared everything in their marriage, he 
“could not be occupied on a work of this kind 
without its being known to [her].”14  In 1831, 
after over a decade of collecting his thoughts 
and writing his seminal work, Carl von 
Clausewitz died of cholera. It fell to his late 
wife to edit his transcripts and publish On War 
posthumously. This is noteworthy because the 
author, himself, only had the opportunity to 
completely edit one book of his volume, and the 
rest were revised and assembled by editors and 
his wife. Some scholars suggest that this is 
causal of contradictions and misinterpretations 
of the text, but Clausewitz’s notes, 
correspondences, and completed sections of his work present a generally 
consistent theory of war.15 
In his preface to On War, Clausewitz defined his terms, stating that there are 
two possible objects of war: the overthrow of the enemy or territorial conquest, 
both of which can manifest themselves in a variety of sub-goals. He then 
introduced the cornerstone of his treatise. War, he wrote, is a “continuation of 
politics by other means.”16  This phrase became one of Clausewitz’s most 
celebrated ideas, and is key to the continued prevalence of his work in political 
spheres.   
War is not an end to itself; it is a tool employed within the greater political 
context to achieve a specific purpose. Clausewitz made this point intentionally, 
well aware of its influence on his theory’s applicability. If war is a political 
choice, the manifestation of each war will “differ in character according to the 
nature of the motives and circumstances from which [it] proceeds.”17 
Interpretations of Clausewitz’s point have varied. A popular usage is to say that 
                                                 
13 Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, “The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly 
Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz,” Journal of 
Military History 79, no. 2 (April 2015): 348. 
14 Clausewitz, On War, 6. 
15 Bellinger, 365-366. 
16 Clausewitz, On War, 9. 
17 Ibid., 25 
Marie von Clausewitz 
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if war is a type of policy, then military matters should be subordinate to the 
government and the people.18 Clausewitz’s description does support this idea; 
since war is created in pursuit of a political aim, it must remain directly in 
rational proportion to its goal. If expenditures surpass the worth of the object, 
then the war must be terminated.19 War as an extension of policy became On 
War’s signature idea, and indeed was an influential concept in the understanding 
of why states go to war. However, there is a risk in reducing Clausewitz’s work 
to this sole axiom. 
A second, uniquely flexible point that Clausewitz makes is the “trinity” 
of war. War, he says, is fundamentally based on hatred and animosity, chance, 
and policy or reason.20 Connected to these three objects are three principle 
characters: the people, the Army, and the Government. The three elements of the 
trinity are not necessarily equal in magnitude, nor are they in a fixed ratio—
therein lies the unique flexibility afforded by this principle. Over the centuries 
when faced with different case studies, the dominance of a particular sphere of 
the trinity could change. A graphical analysis by Janeen Klinger published in 
Parameters depicted the fluctuation in proportions of the trinity from the 18th to 
the 20th century. Klinger demonstrated that in the latter era, hatred and enmity 
grew to be equal in proportion to policy and chance in the makeup of war, which 
changed the motives and execution of warfare.21 This corresponded to 
Clausewitz’s observations of both Prussians and Spaniards, whose resentment 
toward occupation became a primary force for reform and resistance. Since no 
particular aspect was the driving factor of Clausewitz’s theory, war itself 
appeared to shapeshift in response to its variant composition. The trinity adds to 
the widespread relevance of On War as it addresses the foundational groups of 
any conflict in the political and military spheres. 
The trinity is an important concept in On War because it distinguishes 
the spirit and morale of the nation as an intangible driving force, separate from 
tactics and logistics. 
Rationally, it follows that Clausewitz included the emotional will of the people 
as one-third of the substance of war, even though war before Napoleon had 
relied much more on standing armies and paid soldiers. In Book I, while 
describing wars of entire communities, Clausewitz wrote that war “of whole 
                                                 
18 Thomas Waldman, “Politics and War: Clausewitz’s Paradoxical Equation,” 
Parameters 40, no. 3 (Autumn, 2010): 2. 
19 Clausewitz, On War, 19. 
20 Ibid., 26. 
21 Janeen Klinger, “The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz,” Parameters 36, 
no. 1 (Spring, 2006): 86. 
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Nations…always starts from a political condition.”22 Prussia’s military 
reformation movement was a direct result of nationalist sentiment against the 
French occupiers and recognition of the need for modernization.23 Likewise, this 
transformation of the trinity can be applied to a host of conflicts born out of 
nationalism or resentment toward occupiers in the following centuries. Consider 
the Algerian War of Independence. A repressed French colony since 1830, 
Algeria began its own resistance movement against the French in 1954, led by 
the National Liberation Front (FLN). Algerians, who did not yet have their own 
nation-state, engaged in battles, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism against the 
brutality and torture employed by French troops.24 The core of this conflict was 
deeply psychological. Terrorist tactics used by the FLN were driven largely by 
hatred and vengeance, while torture by French paratroopers caused further 
alienation. In fact, these counter-terrorism efforts helped the Algerian nationalist 
cause by winning over international opinion and polarizing French public 
opinion.25 
In Clausewitzian terms, both the FLN and the government of France 
pursued political aims: for the former, political independence, and for the latter, 
the submission or appeasement of its colony. These political aims made the two 
sides diametrically opposed—but the brutality and terror of the conflict drew 
primarily from decades of enmity and resentment borne of mistreatment. All 
three elements of the Clausewitzian trinity were present, but it was morale and 
the willingness of the people to commit terror that won the Battle of Algiers. 
The intentional adaptability of Clausewitz’s trinity allows his theory to be 
applied to numerous wars and conflicts, and is surely evidence of On War’s 
continued relevance. 
While the ideas found in On War are deeply significant, equally 
noteworthy is the methodology used by Clausewitz. On War addressed at length 
the failures of other theorists to create a comprehensive theoretical construction 
of war, but Clausewitz’s preface rejected the idea that such a theory was 
impossible.26 Book III Chapter XVII, “On the Character of Modern War” 
described how war had changed under Napoleon, “since all methods formerly 
usual were upset by [his] luck and boldness.”27 Previously, war had been 
                                                 
22 Clausewitz, On War, 24. 
23 Fremont-Barnes and Fisher, 253-256. 
24 Nancy Gallagher, “Learning Lessons from the Algerian War of 
Independence,” Middle East Report, no.225 (2002): 45. 
25 Gallagher, 45. 
26 Clausewitz, On War, 10. 
27 Ibid., 121. 
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characterized by long periods of standstill—what Clausewitz refers to as the 
“suspension of the act of war,” an inevitable pause in hostilities while the armies 
rested in defense.28  In fact, Clausewitz said that most earlier wars spent more 
time in this “state of equilibrium” than in conflict.29  This was one noticeable 
change of Napoleon’s wars. As the impassioned Jamaica Magazine reported 
about the particularly heightened violence of the Napoleonic Wars, “no equal 
time has ever witnessed such horrors, such wholesale butcheries, such wanton 
devastations, such complicated miseries inflicted by man on man, as the last ten 
years!”30  Again, the context was a key part of the development of Clausewitz’s 
theory. His approach to the subject had to be realistic and as comprehensive as 
possible. 
Clausewitz’s approach to the study of war was unique in its fusion of 
the philosophical with the physical. In Book I of On War, Clausewitz created his 
framework of analysis, emphasizing the importance of both rational and non-
rational elements of warfare. Prior to Clausewitz, theories of war were focused 
on “things belonging to the material world,” merely a “mechanical art” with 
little regard given to the “energies of the mind and the spirit.”31 Clausewitz 
criticized these attempts to create “positive theories” of war based purely on 
mathematical principles, tactics, and materials. “They strive after determinate 
quantities, whilst in War all is undetermined, and the calculation has always to 
be made with varying quantities.”32 His problem with this method of theory-
generation revealed his purpose in writing—not to simply educate on how to 
win battles, but to understand the foundations, and the nature, of war. This set 
him apart in his era and beyond. 
To Clausewitz, war was to be considered a “game both objectively and 
subjectively.”33 The element of chance, as included in the trinity, was inexorably 
linked to the outcome of war. Clausewitz acknowledges the unpredictability of 
war and a leader’s imperfect knowledge of the circumstance and of how an 
enemy will respond. These elements of the nature of war, like its 
unpredictability, unknown circumstances, and need for military genius, created 
what Clausewitz termed “friction.”34  Friction was what separated war “on 
paper” from how war was experienced in reality— “incidents take place upon 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 118. 
29 Clausewitz, On War, 123. 
30 Destructive Effects of the War,” 92. 
31 Clausewitz, On War, 57. 
32 Ibid., 59. 
33 Clausewitz, On War, 23. 
34 Ibid., 50. 
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which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being chance.”35 These 
uncontrollable elements were fundamental to Clausewitz’s method of explaining 
war. He was unsatisfied with competing theories that were built on mathematical 
rules and absolutes. “Theory must also take into account the human element; it 
must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness.”36 
One such competing theorist was Antoine-Henri Jomini, a Swiss 
military theorist contemporaneous with Clausewitz. Jomini published his own 
treatise, Traité de grande tactique, in 1803. Like On War, it was influenced 
greatly by the experience of the Napoleonic Wars, albeit from the opposing side, 
as well as observations of King Frederick’s Prussian army.37 However, Jomini’s 
presentation in this work was practical and utilitarian, compared to Clausewitz’s 
more comprehensive approach. Jomini sought to describe fixed values, physical 
forces, and certainty, while Clausewitz was determined to include the factors of 
friction.38 This difference could not have been due to disinterest in material 
advice on Clausewitz’s part; his preliminary writings for the Prussian Crown 
Prince actually praised Jomini’s advice on strategy.39 But when the time came to 
create a viable, transmutable theory of war, Clausewitz rejected the positivist, 
scientific approach. In fact, Christopher Bassford speculated that On War’s 
criticism of other military theories is aimed at his Swiss counterpart.40 Jomini, 
similarly, did not withhold criticism of Clausewitz’s pretentious style.41 
However, Clausewitz’s death denied him the chance of reading Jomini’s later-
published, revised theory. Summary of the Art of War, published in 1838, 
expanded the content of Jomini’s theory of war to include morale, the limits of 
scientific military theory, and the relationship between politics and war—ideas 
that were likely borrowed from Clausewitz.42 The Prussian’s unique approach to 
the study of war was quick to influence the continent’s other seminal thinkers. 
Another feature of Clausewitz’s methodology was his demonstrated interest 
in historical examples and observable case studies. In the book’s opening notice, 
Clausewitz wrote: “Investigation and observation, philosophy and experience, 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Clausewitz, On War, 23. 
37 Antoine-Henri Jomini, Traité de grande tactique (University of Lausanne, 
1806), 16. 
38 Dictionary of World Biography, Vol. 5, s.v. “Carl von Clausewitz.” 
39 Clausewitz, Principles of War, section 11. 
40 Christopher Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: their interaction,” An edited 
version of a paper presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary 
Europe at Georgia State University, vol. 26., 1993, 7. 
41 Ibid., 8. 
42 Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz,” 8. 
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must neither despise nor exclude one another…the propositions of this 
book…are supported either by experience or by the conception of War itself as 
external points, so that they are not without abutments.”43 On War was 
punctuated by references to the Napoleonic Wars used to illustrate greater, more 
abstract qualities of the nature of war. Spain’s “stubborn resistance” during the 
Peninsular Wars showed how powerfully effective the “general arming of the 
people” and insurgent groups could be, while Prussia proved adding militia to 
the army to be a significant force multiplier.44 Both concrete, historical 
examples showed Clausewitz’s greater point. The “heart and sentiments of a 
Nation” were deeply significant to its political and military strength—and this 
would, inevitably, change how War was fought and organized.45 His purpose in 
writing On War, though, did not lead him to describe specific campaigns or 
tactics in detail; each example that he provided was an illustration of important 
aspects of war and their corresponding human reactions.46 Clausewitz 
acknowledged that although war was being waged in new, unprecedented ways, 
he could observe and draw general principles from historical experience. 
Similarly, the modern reader knows that despite further changes since On War’s 
beginnings, an understanding of the past and its lessons can benefit 
understanding of the present.47 
An additional key aspect of On War’s methodology was Clausewitz’s 
use of a dialectic model, which alternated between discussion of total war and 
limited war. “Total war” referred to a theoretical construct in which war was 
fought to bend the adversary’s will; it was the abstraction, or the idealized 
essence, of war.48 A mathematical consideration of this concept showed that 
each side of a conflict would increase its use of force in proportion to its 
enemy’s resistance, and in this pure world, the mutual enhancement would never 
have reason to stop until the enemy was destroyed.49 Limited war, by contrast, 
was war’s concrete manifestation, within the natural boundaries and “friction” of 
reality. Real war would not come to the utmost extreme of violence. The 
inherent assumption was that only the second form could exist, because of the 
                                                 
43 Clausewitz, On War, 11. 
44 Clausewitz, On War, 121. 
45 Ibid., 121-122. 
46 Peter Paret, “On War Then and Now,” Journal of Military History 80, no. 2 
(April 2016): 483. 
47 Ibid., 484. 
48 Peter R. Moody, “Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War,” World 
Politics 31, no. 3 (1979): 422. 
49 Clausewitz, On War, 16. 
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disorder of reality and the importance of chance. 
However, it is now argued that nuclear technology has brought the 
abstraction of total war into potential, physical existence.50 Nuclear weaponry 
has, undeniably, changed the dialogue that accompanies modern warfare. 
Senator J. William Fulbright, a critic of Clausewitz, made the claim that nuclear 
weapons make the inevitable ends of war completely disproportionate to any 
political aims, rendering Clausewitz’s doctrine “totally obsolete.”51 The 
mentality toward war was altered fundamentally as the world came to 
understand nuclear weaponry; the capacity for destruction was immeasurably 
heightened. But does this change the applicability of Clausewitz’s theory? 
Clausewitz would not have foreseen the advent of total war in the real world. 
However, by anyone’s estimation, it is irrational to fight a nuclear war due to 
Mutually Assured Destruction.  
As Clausewitz pointed out, military action will “in general diminish as 
the political object diminishes.”52 In other words, political motivation and 
morale must be incredibly high in order for reason and rationale to permit total 
war to occur. It is worth returning to the original cornerstone of Clausewitz’s 
theory here: war is a continuation of politics by other means. His point has not 
been lost; instead, the political means have had to be adjusted. The Cold War era 
witnessed nuclear superpowers engaging in proxy wars, indirectly pursuing 
political ideology, and engaging in nuclear brinkmanship. Clausewitz was aware 
that warfare could change, and he built that awareness into his theoretical 
framework. As he wrote, “the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the 
bottom of the conception of War is in no way changed or modified through the 
progress of civilisation.”53 Political reason, chance, and the morale of the people 
are still key determinants of warfare, even if the components of Clausewitz’s 
dialectical method have been transformed into a physical reality that the theorist 
did not foresee. 
In fact, the dialectical model’s description of total war has been the 
subject of significant debate within political thought over the years. 
Undoubtedly, one of the most notorious admirers of Clausewitz was Adolf 
Hitler. Nazi Germany was developed at the hands of German National Socialists 
who revered Clausewitz as an exemplary nationalist and soldier.54 Germans 
                                                 
50 Moody, 418. 
51 Moody, 418. 
52 Clausewitz, On War, 19. 
53 Clausewitz, On War, 15. 
54 P.M. Baldwin, “Clausewitz in Nazi Germany,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 16, no. 1 (1981): 10. 
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celebrated the Prussian military from 1805-1813 as a movement that paralleled 
the Nazi movement of the time.55 Hitler himself quoted Clausewitz on numerous 
occasions, both aloud and in his writings, always in defense of Nazism’s 
embrace of total war.56 Clausewitz wrote that adding any principle of 
moderation to the practice of war was irrational, since absolute war occurs at the 
peak escalation of violence between actors.57 With the dialectic model in view, 
it was understood that this ideal form of war existed only in abstraction, and he 
did not intend this model to advocate absolute brutality. Nevertheless, Hitler 
found the justification and inspiration that he sought. Hitler quoted Clausewitz 
to reprimand his more moderate generals. He was keenly aware of the use of 
war as an extension of politics, stating as early as 1931 that “anyone familiar 
with the thinking of Clausewitz and Schlieffen knows that military strategy can 
also be used in the political battle.”58 His was an uncompromising, absolute 
battle with existential political aims. The complete destruction of the enemy was 
the only possible outcome, and so politics became an extension of war.59 An 
unfair criticism of Clausewitz blames his work for the horror of the World Wars, 
but understanding his dialectical model and abstraction reveals that the guilt of 
misusing a theory lies in the hands of the reader, not the author. 
Clausewitz influenced a number of other influential leaders and 
theorists. He is strongly associated with Marxist-Leninist military thought. 
Lenin, struggling to understand the beginnings of World War I, first read On 
War in 1915, recorded his observations, and applied Clausewitz’s thought to 
political socialism.60 Clausewitz was instrumental in the transformation of 
Lenin’s own philosophy on foreign policy and imperialist war. Lenin’s essay 
“The Principles of Socialism and the War, 1914-1915” connected Marxist ideas 
of class struggle to Clausewitz’s description of war as political means.61 In 1917, 
it was easy, then, to categorize the Russian Revolution as a war that could bring 
the Marxist faction to power through the class struggle.  Eventually, the Marxist-
Leninist movement used On War’s terminology to describe the war between the 
                                                 
55 Adolf Hitler, “Proclamation read by Gauleiter Adolf Wagner” (speech, 
Nurnberg, September 6, 1938), 
Collection of Speeches 1922-1945. 
56 Baldwin, 10. 
57 Clausewitz, On War, 15. 
58 Baldwin, 11. 
59 Ibid., 15. 
60 Jacob W. Kip, “Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism, 1915-
1921,” in Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991, ed. William C. 
Frank and Philip S. Gillette (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992), 68. 
61 Ibid., 70. 
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“proletarian state” and the capitalist, “bourgeois world,” calling for the 
militarization of Marxism.62 Lenin was impressed by Clausewitz’s practical 
information regarding defensive and offensive tactics, but he was especially 
interested in the discussion of the nature of war and its function in history. His 
own communist ideology merged with Clausewitz’s philosophy and created a 
hybrid ideology in response to World War I: war was a continuation of politics 
by violent means, therefore that war was a violent defense of capitalist states’ 
interests.63 
Clausewitz’s theories have been found in Anglo-American military 
thought as well, although not as a constantly acknowledged presence.64 
Christopher Bassford points out that enthusiasm for Clausewitz was elevated in 
the United States following the disastrous Vietnam War, parallel to the rise in 
popularity in England after the South African War.65 He attributes this 
occurrence to the Clausewitz’s description of war as politics, subject to the 
government and enacted by the army and people. The trinity’s shared 
responsibility in this respect can reduce the weight of responsibility felt by the 
military, since the war was not its own prerogative, but a form of government 
policy. Clausewitz was mentioned periodically in American military literature, 
in such publications as The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security 
Issues, which discussed the implications of Clausewitz’s description of strategy 
versus tactics and the role of the trinity in matters of war.66 His contribution to 
military thought affected both the philosophy and strategy taught in modern 
American military academies. Even President Eisenhower is 
reported to have named On War as the most influential military book that he had 
read, having read it three times.67 
Technological advancements have changed who is capable of 
widespread destruction and how quickly it can occur, but the essential nature of 
conflict remains as Clausewitz broadly stated in the trinity and in his link 
between politics and war. However, Clausewitz wrote with the expectation that 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 77. 
63 Azar Gat, “Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 27, no. 2 (1992): 371. 
64 Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in 
Britain and America 1815- 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 5. 
65 Bassford, Clausewitz in English, 203. 
66 J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., “Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy,” in The 
U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, 4th  ed. (2010): 4-9. 
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war would occur between nation-states, as history had demonstrated to that 
point. In the modern era, scholars termed as “New War theorists” have rejected 
Clausewitz based on this fact, in view of the rise of non-state actors and ethnic 
disputes.68 However, the principles that Clausewitz laid out can feasibly be 
extrapolated to these modern phenomena. State- sponsored terrorism, for 
example, occurs when a foreign power funds or supports a terrorist organization 
to gain power in the region.69 It is surely an extension of politics, as it is a 
strategic use of force to accomplish a certain political end. A clear case study of 
this concept is the Iranian-backed political-terrorist organization, Hezbollah. 
Hezbollah has been integrated into the Lebanese government as a political party 
that provides social services and infrastructure, as well as support for the 
families of suicide martyrs. Within Lebanon, Hezbollah is largely considered to 
be legitimate—possibly even more influential than the state or a regular political 
party.70 However, the organization retains its own independent arms capability 
that it has used frequently throughout history to achieve its political goals, 
particularly in attacks on Israeli civilians and military.71 Despite its being a non-
state actor, Hezbollah has organized military units, tactics studiously developed 
in correlation to Israel’s strengths, the support and passion of its nation, and 
rationally-determined policies. State-sponsored terrorism employs the three 
principles of the Clausewitzian trinity; in fact, it has been postulated that 
terrorism is a war-substitute that increases the proportion of hatred and enmity 
with respect to chance and political reason.72 Although terrorism is an indirect 
and asymmetric form of violence, defined differently than “war,” relevant 
comparisons can still be drawn. Clausewitz’s point that war is inseparable from 
politics remains as true as ever, and these new forms of warfare are challenging 
because of the modern-day complexity of political contexts.73 But to deny On 
War’s adaptability is to ignore Clausewitz’s own prescient acknowledgment that 
war does change forms. “War is, therefore, not only chameleon-like in character, 
because it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case, but it is 
                                                 
68 Bart Schuurman, “Clausewitz and the ‘New Wars’ Scholars,” Parameters 4-, 
no. 1 (Spring, 2010): 90. 
69 Brad Roberts, “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Has the Taboo 
Been Broken?”, Politics and the Life Sciences 15, no. 2 (1996): 216. 
70 Julie C. Herrick, “Nonstate Actors: A Comparative Analysis of Change and 
Development within Hamas and Hezbollah,” The Changing Middle East: A New Look at 
Regional Dynamics, edited by Korany Baghat, American University in Cairo Press, 2011: 
183. 
71 Herrick, 187. 
72 Klinger, 87. 
73 Waldman, 12. 
Tenor of Our Times 
 
 
81 
 
also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in 
it…”74According to Clausewitz, the form of war, itself, can change in relation to 
whichever third of the trinity is predominant. Violence, chance, and political 
ends are not foregone in the modern forms of war. They are present in the 
actions of non-state actors and terrorist organizations. 
Altogether, On War’s content and methods aimed to describe the nature 
of war in reality. As already mentioned, this entailed some description of the 
strategy and purpose of entering a war, as well as the intangible elements of 
friction and moral forces. Clausewitz listed four elements that composed the 
“atmosphere” of war: danger, physical effort, uncertainty, and chance.75 The 
existence of these conditions demanded a degree of courage and passion from 
the soldiers—and in times of difficulty, good leadership in the commander. 
Clausewitz did not pretend that war was a predictable game that could be 
perfectly played, or that armies operated as smoothly as machines. Like a man 
trying to walk in water, movement in war was always met with resistance—so 
the best war theorist, and the synthesis of Clausewitz’s dialectic model, was 
someone who had experienced the reality of war but could also draw 
generalizations about it.76 War could best be theorized by a soldier-scholar who 
recognized that it was a social activity, subject to human emotion and dependent 
on both physical and moral forces.77 On War does include technical details and 
information about strategy and tactics, but the overall themes of the work are 
illustrations of the nature of war and its human participants. All of these factors 
combined, from On War’s content, applications, and methods, culminated in a 
political philosophy of war whose relevance spanned generations. As author 
Antulio Echevarria II wrote, “Our understanding of war’s nature, or whether we 
believe it has one, influences how we approach the conduct of war—how we 
develop military strategy, doctrine and concepts, and train and equip combat 
forces.”78 Clausewitz created a theoretical foundation, not to recommend 
specific strategy and tactics to the limited context of the 19th century, but to 
better comprehend the complex nature of war itself. Aware that his death could 
interrupt the revision of his theory, he acknowledged that his work might be 
“open to endless misconceptions” that would “give rise to a number of crude 
criticisms”, but despite its imperfection, he hoped that the impartial, truth- 
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seeking reader would find “leading ideas which may bring about a revolution in 
the theory of War.”79 
Carl von Clausewitz’s life experiences granted him a distinct degree of 
expertise in the conduct and nature of war. The Napoleonic Wars provided 
fertile ground for the study of this violent streak in humanity that countless 
scholars and leaders have attempted to understand and better use. On War had 
short-term influence on other generals, military men, and theorists like Jomini 
following its publication. It had long- term effects on numerous world leaders 
and students of statecraft, in spite of the changing times. Clausewitz presented 
war as an extension of politics composed of a trinity of forces, used 
methodology which remains applicable, and wrote with the purpose of 
elucidating not only the strategic manner of warfare, but its very nature—and in 
doing so, he created a uniquely flexible understanding of the art of war. As the 
more recent historical examples have demonstrated, On War’s description of the 
nature of war and its components is linked to politics and to human nature. Its 
application, though misused by some and criticized by others, has nonetheless 
left an indelible mark on the understanding of war’s place in statecraft and 
political thought. 
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